Introduction
This paper analyzes the effects of globalization on social expenditures as a share of total public expenditures in Western and Eastern European countries. A particular focus is on differences in the globalization effect across welfare regimes.
In the literature two hypotheses about the direction of the globalization effect on social welfare expenditures are advanced: the efficiency and the compensation hypotheses. The efficiency hypothesis argues that globalization generally restrains governments via increased budgetary pressure due to trade liberalization and increased factor mobility (Dreher et al (2008a) ).
Moreover, fiscal competition among governments for mobile factors of production may lead to a relative decline in the supply of public consumption goods in general and welfare expenditures in particular (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) ; Sinn (1997) ).
2 More specifically, the share of public consumption goods in total public expenditures might decrease as a large share is frequently seen as an impediment to international competitiveness. Thus, globalization leads not only to a general decline in public expenditures but also to a shift towards public inputs, which benefit firms (see Keen and Marchand (1997) ;
Matsumoto (2000)).
In contrast, the compensation hypothesis argues that governments expand the welfare state to insure citizens against increased economic risks due to globalization (Rodrik (1997 and ; Garret and Mitchell (2001) ; Swank (2002) ). It is in the interest of governments to expand social welfare expenditures as citizens (voters) seek to be compensated by the public sector (Rodrik (1998) ). Thus, the compensation hypothesis predicts a demand-led change in the structure of government expenditure in favor of public consumption goods and social expenditures in particular.
The two views need not be interpreted as competing hypotheses. They rather constitute two effects operating in opposite directions, off-setting each other. As Dreher et al (2008a) argue, one can think of the government as balancing the benefits and costs of providing public goods and services. Globalization leads to a downward pressure on public expenditures, on public consumption goods in particular, through the efficiency channel. At the same time, according to the compensation hypothesis, the demand for public social expenditures rises and so does the associated benefit or incentive for the policy maker.
Hence, no clear-cut theoretical predictions about the effects of globalization on the share of social welfare expenditures in total expenditures may be given. Thus, empirical exploration is required to ascertain whether the evolution of the social welfare expenditure share is dominated by the efficiency or the compensation effect.
A number of empirical papers (see the surveys provided by Dreher et al (2008a) and Gemmel et al (2008) ) try to shed light on this issue. The major part of this empirical research proceeds by modeling either total government expenditures or a particular element of public spending as a function of one or more proxies for globalization. Usually a country's openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) or some compound globalization measure (see Table 1 in Gemmel et al. (2008) ; Adam and Kamas (2007) ; Görg et al. (2007) ; Potrafke (2009) ) is used to proxy the globalization phenomenon.
Recently, several papers also analyze the impact globalization has on the composition of government expenditures by jointly relating various components of public expenditures to proxies for globalization (see Dreher et al. (2008a) ; Gemmel et al (2008) ; Sanz and Velazquez (2007) ; Shelton (2007) ).
Unfortunately, like theoretical predictions the empirical evidence is also ambiguous, as the number of studies supporting the efficiency hypothesis is matched by studies favoring the compensation hypothesis (see Gemmel et al (2008) , pg. 156). Moreover, some studies (e.g. Dreher et al (2008a) ; Sanz and Velazquez (2007) ) find no globalization effect at all. Finally, Bretschger and Hettich (2002) argue in favor of existing complementarities between the efficiency and compensation hypotheses. They find that globalization has a negative and significant impact on corporate income tax rates. At the same time globalization also raises social expenditures. Thus, "the efficiency and the compensation hypotheses therefore both have a role in explaining government behaviour, the former for revenue, the latter for expenditure." (Bretschger and Hettich 2002, p. 714) Notable features of the available studies are that most of them are based on a sample of advanced OECD countries (see Table 1 in Gemmel et al (2008) ) and none of them explicitly analyses the influence of welfare regimes on the dissemination of globalization effects. These observations are the starting points for the current study. Based on the available prior work, this paper seeks to explain the effect of globalization on social protection expenditures as a share of total public expenditures. We add to the literature by focusing on differences between
Western and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in the EU and on the isolation of globalization effects conditional on the welfare regimes in force. Various proxy variables for the globalization process are used in the empirical estimations (openness to trade and FDI as well as compound globalization measures capturing several aspects of the multi-facetted globalization phenomenon).
The focus on CEECs is chosen because globalization might exert different effects on transition countries compared to advanced Western European democracies: On the one hand, Eastern European governments have been especially active in using fiscal policy tools like cuts in effective corporate income taxes (e.g. Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) ), the introduction of flat-rate personal income taxes (e.g. Keen et al (2006) ) or the creation of special economic zones (e.g. World Bank (2008)) to attract foreign capital. These tax and subsidy decisions may necessitate budget consolidation in terms of social expenditure cuts.
On the other hand, after the transition crisis unemployment has increased and labor force participation rates of women and elderly people have decreased significantly (Havlik and Landesmann (2005); Onaran (2008) ). In particular, privatization-led FDI went along with early pension schemes for the older population, dramatically increasing the need for social protection expenditures. Moreover, the process of accession to the EU might have generated EU level external pressures for the development of welfare states as well as advances in domestic parliamentary democracy, which can militate towards high levels of welfare provision (see Orenstein and Hass (2005) ).
For the Western countries, we explicitly separate the effects of globalization on countries grouped by the welfare regimes in force. 3 The country specific institutional and political context may make a difference in terms of mediating the effects of globalization. Specifically, welfare regimes, with their particular levels and structures of expenditures on social welfare, display path-dependency as national traditions, institutions, resource dependency, cost of alternatives, and voters' interests transform common challenges into welfare regime specific challenges (Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) ; Taylor-Gooby (2001); Esping-Andersen (1996);
Swank (2001)). Thus path-dependence may create an institutional lock-in of governments and citizens' behaviors. For instance, in generous welfare states expectations as well as dependency relations by citizens may be created which cannot be changed quickly given the public support for welfare state measures and governments' electoral considerations. Then scaling down of social protection expenditures is relatively unlikely. In contrast, if social protection is not widespread, it might be hard to form the coalitions to demand it under the competitive pressures of globalization and limited room for tax increases (see Kautto and Kvist (2002) ). In this case, scaling up social protection expenditures is rather unlikely.
However, several authors (e.g. Brady et al (2005) ; Adelantado and Cuevas (2006) ) point out that globalization may lead to welfare retrenchment in generous welfare states like the Scandinavian countries, while forcing an increase in less generous welfare regimes. This view implies convergence towards the middle. Downward convergence may be related to the existence of limits to growth of the welfare regime given already existing high tax rates leaving little room to increase spending and taxation (Huber and Stephens (2001) ). Upward or "catchup" convergence of the less generous welfare regimes might be triggered by increasing demand for compensation along with globalization and the need to make openness politically acceptable or by increased political integration in the context of the EU (Kautto and Kvist (2002) ). These arguments again support the view that globalization should exert different effects across welfare regimes.
We concentrate on public social protection expenditures here as these expenditures are indisputably the expenditure category that one expects to be positively (negatively) affected by the compensation (efficiency) effect of globalization. 4 Other public spending categories can be viewed simultaneously as public consumption goods and as public inputs. For instance, education expenditures might be considered a public input as human capital is a factor of production. 5 Thus, it is not entirely clear whether globalization's efficiency effects should reduce or increase these expenditures. Concentrating on social expenditures reduces this ambiguity. Note that we normalize social protection expenditures by total public expenditures.
This normalization more narrowly reflects the expenditure priorities set within the public sector than normalizing by GDP (see Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) ). However, to capture the importance of the public sector in an economy we also control for the (one year lagged) share of total public expenditures in GDP in the estimations.
Based on a two-way fixed effects estimator and on the operationalization of the multi-facetted phenomenon of globalization by three KOF globalization indices (see Dreher (2006b) and Dreher et al (2008b) ) 6 we find evidence in favor of the compensation hypothesis in Western
Europe. However, we see that this compensation process is mainly driven by a conservative welfare regime. In contrast, in social-democratic welfare regimes evidence in favor of the efficiency hypothesis is established. These different trends are consistent with the convergence view outlined above. However, neither upward convergence nor downward pressure is established for the southern and liberal welfare regimes. Concerning CEECs, the paper finds evidence in favor of the efficiency hypothesis.
The paper is structured as follows: Section two reviews literature on institutional background and welfare regime typologies. Section three presents the model applied in the empirical analysis. Section four describes the variables and databases used and section five presents the results. Section six concludes the paper. This categorization has been criticized in respect of the range of countries and regimes, the overemphasis on cash benefits and the absence of gender implications (see Bambra (2006) ; Kasza (2002) ; Leibfried (1992) Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997) . According to Ferrera (1996) southern countries are inter alia characterized by a highly fragmented and polarized welfare regime with generous pensions paired with substantial gaps in the social safety net, a departure from the corporatist tradition in the field of health care, a highly collusive mix between public and private institutions in the welfare sphere and the persistence of clientelism in the distribution of cash subsidies.
While some studies see welfare states in post communist countries within the liberal welfare regime, based on a mix of social insurance and social assistance and a partial privatization of social policy with just a few corporatist attributes (e.g. Ferge (2001); Standing (1996) ), others argue that the CEECs constitute a separate post-socialist regime type (Aidukaite (2004) ;
Lelkes (2000)).
Moreover, Fenger (2007) distinguishes a "post-communist European type" welfare regime and a "former USSR type" regime. He argues that the post-communist European type (including Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) seem to mix characteristics of both the conservative and the social-democratic types of Esping-Andersen.
Fenger (2007) Taken together, the studies dealing with post communist countries suggest that there is some heterogeneity in the welfare regime type across them. However, the new CEE EU member countries seem to have rather similar welfare regimes in force. I
It is important that these countries constitute a particular welfare regime type which is different from those in force in West European countries. This provides further justification for splitting countries between West and East in the empirical analysis. 
where (i) is the country index (ranging from 1 to 27) and (t) is the year index (ranging from 1990 to 2006). EX it is the share of social protection expenditures in total public expenditures in country (i) and year (t). G it-1 is the one year lagged globalization indicator and C it-1 is the matrix of one year lagged control variables. α i captures country fixed effects, ω t captures time fixed effects and ε it is the remainder error term.
To analyze whether globalization exerts a differential impact upon West European countries and on CEECs, we estimate the empirical model shown in Equation 1 not only for the full sample but also for the Western and Eastern European country groups separately.
As outlined in section two, the globalization impact on social protection expenditures might 
where D j is a dummy variable representing the different welfare regimes. For instance, if j = 1 D has entry 1 if a country belongs to the social-democratic welfare regime and zero otherwise. j = 2 is for the conservative, j = 3 for the southern and j = 4 for the liberal welfare regime.
Thus, the estimated coefficients β j can be directly interpreted as the marginal effect of a one unit increase in the respective globalization indicator on the share of public social protection expenditures conditional on the respective welfare regime. Due to data limitations we differentiate the globalization variable by welfare regimes but not the control variables contained in C it-1 . However, we also control for welfare regime specific time trends, captured by in Equation 2. Including welfare specific time trends aims to capture differences in developments over time in social expenditures across welfare regimes. If pathdependence plays a role, such differences are likely to be present. Note that, as we also include a full set of time dummies one of the welfare regime specific trends cannot be identified. This is the reason why the second summation index in Equation 2 runs from 1 to 3.
Also note that including a trend variable in Equation 1 would not change results as we apply a two-way fixed effects estimator.
As shown, all right-hand side variables enter into Equations 1 and 2 with a one year lag. This is done for two reasons: First, to cope with time lags in the political decision and budgeting process and second, to mitigate potential problems due to reverse causality. A better way to cope with endogeneity issues would be to apply a GMM-approach. However, due to the low number of cross-sections (countries) a reliable GMM-estimation is precluded (also see Potrafke 2009 ). 8 A second best approach is to use lagged values of the right-hand side variables (see Wooldridge (2002, pg. 301) ). In each estimation the variance-covariance-matrix of the remainder error term, ε it , is calculated using the approach developed by Newey and West (1987) . Therefore, standard errors are fully robust with respect to serial correlation as well as general heteroscedasticity (see Baum et al. (2007) ). 9 Estimations are carried out with Schaffer's xtivreg2 Stata command (see Schaffer (2010) ).
Data issues and control variables a. Measuring social expenditures
The data for expenditures on social protection as a share of total expenditures ( ) is taken from Eurostat's COFOG database (Eurostat 2007 and . This database provides internationally comparable data on 10 functional expenditure categories, including the item "social protection", capturing inter alia socially motivated expenditures on sickness and disability, old age, family and children, survivors, unemployment and housing.
The novelty and decisive difference of the Eurostat dataset is that it is the first to cover all 27 EU member states. organizations to which the country is a member of, the number of international treaties signed, personal contacts, information flows and cultural proximity (Dreher (2006b) ).
As captures the globalization phenomenon in the broadest available sense it is our preferred globalization measure.
It has to be stressed that the correlations between trade and FDI, respectively, with the KOF indices are relatively low (cf. Table A3 ). For example, the correlation of trade (FDI) with is 0.46 (0.66). This tends to confirm the problems associated with measuring the globalization phenomenon (see Dreher et al (2008, pg. 271 ) on this issue).
10 Rodrik (1998) and Adam and Kammas (2007) (2007)).
We use the lagged growth rate of real GDP ( ) to capture the influence of the economic cycle on the share of social protection expenditures. In a recession, social transfers are expected to rise whereas periods of high growth lead to a decrease in unemployment claims.
Another control variable is the one year lagged inflation rate ( ), measured as the yearly growth rate in the GDP deflator with base year 1995. This variable intends to capture shifts in expenditures due to differences in governmental "price-setting" power between expenditure categories. Specifically, the government behaves more as a price taker for some expenditure categories (e.g. expenditures on economic services), but for social protection it might be a quasi-monopolist. This difference in price-setting power might have an impact on the share of social expenditures in total expenditures. Specifically, because many social protection expenditures are not inflation adjusted we expect a negatively signed coefficient.
Lagged government debt ( ) measured as general government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP on the one hand intends to capture constraints of a government's "room for maneuver". In particular, higher debt levels imply higher levels of interest payments (e.g. Sanz and Velazquez (2007) ) and ceteris paribus a lower share of social protection expenditures. From this perspective a negative relationship of this variable with the social protection expenditures can therefore be expected. On the other hand, as stressed by Sanz and Velazquez (2007) a pressure to reduce public debt in GDP might also decrease the share of social protection expenditures, if fiscal adjustment mainly falls "upon social welfare so as to protect productive government expenditure" (ibidem, p. 922). Thus, also a positive relationship between ( ) and the share of social protection expenditures is plausible. A priori the impact of the lagged debt level on the share of social protection expenditures is therefore ambiguous.
The dependency ratio ( ) is measured as the number of persons in the age groups 0-15 and 65 and over as a ratio of the working age population. Its lagged value aims to proxy the effect of the importance of an inactive population on social expenditures. The effect of an aging society should be particularly well captured by this variable. A positive relationship is expected.
The one year lagged ratio of total public spending to GDP ( ) serves as another control variable. This variable intends to capture the importance of the public sector in an economy. Specifically, in minimalist states expenditures for social protection are probably of relatively low importance (see Dreher et al (2008a) ). A positive relationship with the share of social protection expenditures is thus expected.
In order to cope with small country bias (see Bretschger and Hettich (2002) CEECs. In specifications (1)- (3) globalization is captured by and in specifications (4)- (6) by .
[ Clearly, both variables, trade and FDI volumes, are rather narrow definitions of the multifacetted globalization phenomenon. Therefore Table 2 shows results for Equation (1) estimated using the three KOF indices of globalization. In specifications (1)- (3) the globalization variable is , in specifications (4)- (6) it is , and in specifications (7)- (9) abolished in these countries before the start of our sample period. Tables 1 and 2 signal the importance of carefully considering the operationalization of the globalization phenomenon. Moreover, results reveal that the globalization impact may differ across country groups. Using the KOF indices, which capture the multi-facetted phenomenon of globalization better than single trade or FDI variables, we conclude that there is evidence in favor of compensation effects prevailing in West European countries and efficiency effects in the CEECs.
Taken together the results displayed in
[ Table 2 about here]
Regarding control variables, we discuss the results displayed in Table 2 It is difficult to compare our results concerning the globalization impact with prior literature.
Countries and time span considered, econometric approaches applied and measurement of the globalization phenomenon vary substantially between the available studies (also see Gemmel et al (2008) Garret and Mitchell (2001) (also see Table 1 in Gemmel et al (2008) ). Based on panel data these authors inter alia also explore globalization effects on the share of social protection expenditures using the trade volume as proxy for globalization. On the other hand, our results are add odds with the studies of Hicks and Swank (1992) , Huber et al (1993) b. Globalization, social expenditures and welfare regimes So far we have focused on differences between Western and Eastern European countries.
Next we control for heterogeneity among welfare states regimes within Western Europe. The results are reported in Table 3 .
The results indicate important differences regarding the response to globalization across welfare regime and are robust with respect to the choice of the KOF index. Specifically, globalization exerts efficiency effects on countries in the social-democratic welfare regime. In contrast, the compensation hypothesis is verified for the conservative welfare regime. No effect is found for the liberal and southern welfare regimes. Hence, globalization leads particularly to efficiency pressures on the most generous welfare regime. Moreover, some evidence of convergence of the social-democratic and the conservative welfare regimes exists . As noted, the absence of a statistical relationship between globalization and the share of social protection in the southern and the liberal welfare regimes might indicate that there are no globalization effects at work at all or that efficiency and compensation effects cancel each other out in these welfare regimes.
[ Table 3 about here]
Concerning control variables Table 3 implies that the growth rate of real GDP, the debt level and the importance of the public sector matter for the share of social protection expenditures.
As expected, the coefficient of is negative and that of positive.
Moreover, some evidence exists that larger countries have lower shares of social expenditures. The time dummies (jointly) as well as the welfare regime specific trends are statistically significant.
The negative impact of globalization on the share of social expenditures in the socialdemocratic welfare regime is consistent with the arguments set out by Huber and Stephens (2001) about the welfare retrenchment effects of globalization and limits to t expansion in very generous welfare regimes, where tax rates are already high and there is little room to increase spending via higher taxation. Moreover, the predominance of the compensation effect in the conservative welfare regime is consistent with Kautto and Kvist (2002) who cite evidence demonstrating a "catch-up convergence" in France and Netherlands. In the conservative welfare regimes national institutions, resource dependency, and voters' interests prevent the scaling down of social protection expenditures and create further pressures to meet the demand for compensation against the vulnerabilities created by globalization. Our findings are also consistent with Achterberg and Yerkes (2009) or Adelantado and Cuevas (2006) , who
show that there is no general trend towards a retrenchment of welfare regimes.
c. Robustness checks
We conducted several robustness checks to explore the sensitivity of our results with respect to the control variables included and the econometric approach applied. The robustness analysis is based on our preferred specification based on the broadest globalization index, and the split by welfare regimes displayed in Column 3 of Table 3 . Table 4 displays the results of the robustness analysis. Column 1 shows that our results are broadly unaltered in case is substituted by the unemployment rate ( ). As expected the coefficient of carries a positive sign and is statistically significant. The only difference compared to our preferred specification is the insignificant impact of .
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results when a variable indicating the ideology of the government cabinet in force is added ( ). 14 Political scientists produced a great deal of theory about the impact of partisan politics and political parties on government expenditures. 15 As is 1 for hegemony of right-wing parties and 5 for left-wing parties we expect its coefficient to have a positive sign. However, Column 2 of Table 4 shows that this variable neither enters our preferred specification with a statistically significant effect nor does its inclusion change our substantive results. Potrafke (2009) provides some evidence that partisan politics might matter for the share of social protection expenditures in interaction with globalization, rather than in isolation. However since the aim of this paper is to highlight the effects of globalization rather than partisan politics, we do not explore the interaction effects further.
Column 3 and Column 4 show that our substantive results are also robust with respect to the exclusion of insignificant variables ( and ) from the preferred specification.
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The specification shown in Column 5 includes the CEECs as a fifth welfare regime. Results displayed are fully consistent with those in Column 3 of Table 3 and Column 9 in Table 2 :
Efficiency effects dominate in social-democratic countries and in CEECs whereas the evidence is in favor of the compensation hypothesis in the conservative welfare regime.
Again, no effect is established for the liberal and the southern welfare regimes.
Finally, Column 6 of Table 4 shows that our results are also unaltered if we exclude time dummies and correct non-parametrically for contemporaneous correlation in residuals.
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[ globalization like portfolio investments, income payments to foreigners, de jure measures like capital controls and trade restrictions as well as social and political globalization. Thus, the KOF indices have advantages as they capture the multi-facetted globalization phenomenon more broadly than proxies based on single aspects, like trade and FDI volume. Welfare regimes used are based on an "augmented" Esping-Andersen" typology.
There are important differences between Eastern and Western Europe as well as among welfare regimes in Western Europe. Regarding Western Europe, globalization measured by the KOF indices leads to an increased share of social protection expenditures. This finding is consistent with the view that the demand for protection against vulnerability and income losses in the age of globalization outweighs efficiency pressures exerted by globalization.
Thus, the evidence provided here is in favor of the compensation hypothesis. Regarding the CEECs the analysis implies that globalization leads to a significant decline in the share of social protection expenditures. Hence, the CEECs verify the efficiency hypothesis.
There are further differences between the welfare regimes within Western Europe. The share of social protection is increasing due to globalization in the conservative welfare regime and decreasing in the social-democratic welfare regime. Moreover, we find that our globalization variables are unrelated to the share of social protection expenditures in the liberal and southern welfare regimes. This implies that globalization has no effect at all in these regimes or that efficiency and compensation effects cancel each other out.
Although our analysis implies that the effects of globalization on social protection expenditures should be analyzed by disaggregating the welfare regimes and country groups, we stress that the results derived are based on a rather limited data set, especially for CEECs. Thus, results are indicative rather than conclusive. Further empirical analysis of the topic is clearly needed. Note: for convenience are time and country identifier excluded 
